

HEY! YOU! GET OFF MY CLOUD! ATTACKS AGAINST CLOUD HONEYPOTS

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Cloud Adoption

Choose two:



Cloud Models

Public

IaaS

PaaS

SaaS

Private

Cloud Models

Public


IaaS

PaaS


SaaS

Private

IaaS Cloud Security Layers



Threat Model




Elastic Computing


Development



Deployment



Low utilisation
Low cost




Heavy utilisation
High cost

My AWS account was hacked and I have a \$50,000 bill, how can I reduce the amount I need to pay?


For years, my bill was never above \$350/month on my single AWS instance. Then over the weekend someone got hold of my private key and launched hundreds of instances and racked up a \$50,000 bill before I found out about it on Tuesday. Amazon had sent a warning by email at \$15,000 saying they had found our key posted publicly, but I didn't see it. Naturally, this is a devastating amount of money to pay.

Threat Types - Customers


Cloud Environment




On Premise Environment



Relative Threats - Cloud vs On Premise



Cloud Threats by Customer Industry Vertical




Subtle Differences

Cloud threats \neq On premise threats

Your threats \neq Your neighbour's threats

Honeytrap Infrastructure



Honeypot Types

Low Interaction

- Simulates high level services
- Collects basic information

Medium Interaction

- Simulates generic functions
- Records interaction

High Interaction

- Simulates specific environment
- Collects details of attack

Medium Interaction

Kippo – medium interaction

<https://github.com/desaster/kippo>

- Simulates SSH shell
- Fake file system
- Easily detected! – we use heavily modified version
- We used to log brute force attacks & replay session

Medium Interaction

Dionaea – medium interaction

<http://dionaea.carnivore.it/>

- Simulates network services
- SMB / HTTP / FTP / MySQL / SIP (VOIP)
- Simulates shellcode execution
- We see mostly SMB activity

Amun – low interaction

<http://amunhoney.sourceforge.net/>

- Modular Honeypot
- Simulates vulnerable services
- We see mostly SMB activity

Low Interaction

p0f – low interaction

<http://amunhoney.sourceforge.net/>

- Fingerprint connecting IPs
- Run in tandem

Custom Interaction

Create your own


- Modify modular honeypot
- Reflect your environment
- Respond to new threats
- Research attacks against specific vulnerabilities

Results


What do we find?

April 2015


Findings – Top 20 IP Addresses



Findings – Top 20 Source Countries




Findings – Attacker OS




- Linux 2.4.x
- Windows XP
- Linux 3.1-3.10
- Linux 2.2.x-3.x
- Windows 7 or 8
- Linux 2.6.x
- Linux 3.11 and newer
- Linux 2.4.x-2.6.x
- Linux 2.2.x-3.x (no timestamps)
- Linux 3.x
- Linux 2.2.x-3.x (barebone)
- Windows NT kernel
- Linux 2.0

Findings – Top 20 Destination Ports




- Secure Shell (SSH)
- Microsoft Directory Service
- Remote Desktop Protocol
- NETBIOS Session Service
- SMTP
- HTTP
- Active API Server Port (Proxy)
- Telnet
- POP3
- HTTP Alternate (Proxy)
- MySQL
- Microsoft SQL Server
- Abyss Web Server
- HTTPS
- FTP
- Socks (Proxy)
- Universal Plug 'N Play (UPnP)
- Microsoft DCOM
- IMAP
- Apple OSX RPC Services

Findings – Top 20 Brute Forced Usernames




Findings – Top 20 Brute Forced Username/Password




- root/admin
- admin/admin
- root/123654
- root/default
- root/zaq1xsw2
- root/a123456
- root/11111111
- root/changeme
- root/qwerty
- root/admin1
- root/123456]
- root/654321
- root/administrator
- root/qazwsx
- root/888888
- root/aaaaaa
- root/root
- root/159357
- root/meiyoumima
- root/vision

Honeypots in Operation

Honey pots for Managed Services



Honey pots for Managed Services



Conclusion

Cloud environments have a specific threat profile.
Well placed honeypots provide timely intelligence.
Apply intelligence to protect production systems.

Get Connected

www.alertlogic.com



@alertlogic @mlee_security



linkedin.com/company/alert-logic



alertlogic.com/resources/blog/



youtube.com/user/AlertLogicTV



brighttalk.com/channel/11587

Thank you

Will Semple – VP ActiveIntelligence

Brian Wilson – Director, Intelligence

Michael Laughlin – Tools Engineer

Thank you.

